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INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE: MARYLAND'S STATE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR ILLEGALLY OBTAINED 
EVIDENCE 
Carrie Leonetti t 
Maryland residents' protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures derives from two primary sources: the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution 1 and Article 26 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, 2 which predates the federal provision. 3 The 
t Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. Previously, she was an 
Assistant Public Defender in the Appellate Division of the Maryland Office of the 
Public Defender from 2002-2004 and a Law Clerk to the Honorable Irma S. Raker of 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland from 2000-2002. She extends her deepest gratitude 
to Channa France for her research assistance, to Leslie Harris, Tom Lininger, and the 
rest of the faculty at the University of Oregon for all of their assistance and support, 
and to Judge Raker for being a patient sounding board and worthy adversary in 
discussing the ideas in this Article for the better part of the past decade. 
1. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures constrains the actions of Maryland's state and local authorities 
because the United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth Amendment and applies its 
protections to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
2. Article 26 states, in pertinent part, "[t]hat all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to 
search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and 
oppressive." MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 26. 
3. The issuance and validity of search warrants in Maryland has also been governed by 
statute since 1939. See Act of May 11, 1939, ch. 749, 1939 Md. Laws 1606 (current 
version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § l-203(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 
2007)). The current statute implements and supplements the provisions of Article 26, 
and provides that a judge may issue a search warrant whenever there is probable cause 
to believe that a crime is being committed or there is property subject to seizure under 
the criminal laws of the state. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § l-203(a)(l) 
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007) (original version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 306 
(1939)). The statute also provides that, if it later appears that there was no probable 
cause to issue the search warrant, the judge shall cause property taken under the 
search warrant to be returned to the person from whom it was taken. !d. § 1-
231 
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Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and 
establishes a warrant requirement based upon probable cause. 4 In its 
literal terms, Article 26 contains only a warrant requirement, but 
Maryland courts have long interpreted it to prohibit unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the same circumstances as the Fourth 
Amendment. 5 
There has been a great deal of scholarly literature highlighting the 
differences between state constitutional law and federal constitutional 
law, particularly in the context of criminal procedure. 6 This Article 
seeks to provide one example of a state court, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, whose lockstep interpretation of one of its state 
constitutional provisions, Article 26 of the Declaration of Rights, in 
conjunction with its federal counterpart, the Fourth Amendment, 
resulted in Maryland's loss of its historically independent and 
adequate state law remedy for illegal searches and seizures. 
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United 
States7 that articles seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
could not be admitted in evidence at trial. 8 In the wake of Weeks, a 
majority of state courts have adopted the view that their respective 
state constitutions' search-and-seizure provisions similarly prohibit 
the admission of illegally seized evidence. 9 The Court of Appeals of 
203(b )(I). If there was probable cause, the judge must order the property to be 
retained by the state. Id. § l-203(b)(5). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5. See, e.g., Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 492-93, 124 A.2d 764, 768 (1956); Rubin v. 
State, 180 Md. 279, 287, 23 A.2d 706, 710-11 (1942); Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 
371, 198 A. 710,716 (1938). 
6. See, e.g., Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Individual Liberties": North 
Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1749, 1750-51 (1992); Christopher 
Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced 
Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 653, 661-62 (1987). 
7. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
8. Id. at 398. 
9. See Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 508, 864 A.2d 1006, 1020 (2004) ("Now, 
fourty-six [sic] states have an exclusionary rule for their state constitutions."); I 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
1.5(b) (3d ed. 1996) (citation omitted) ("When (as is occurring with greater 
frequency) a state court finds that a certain arrest or search passes muster under the 
Fourth Amendment but that it violates the comparable provision of the state 
constitution, there does not appear to be any dissent from the conclusion that the fruits 
thereof must be suppressed from evidence."); see, e.g., Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1923). 
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Maryland resisted this call in 1928 in a sharply divided opinion in 
Meisinger v. State. 10 
Since Meisinger, Maryland courts have often repeated, with great 
authority, that Maryland has no state exclusionary rule for illegally 
obtained evidence. 11 Oft-repeated though it may be, countercurrents 
in Maryland's case law call this claim into question. 12 The Meisinger 
court purported to uphold the traditional rule that competent evidence 
could not be attacked collaterally on the basis of the manner in which 
it was obtained, 13 but an opinion from the court of appeals dealing 
with the relationship between Articles 26 and 22 14 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights suggests that Maryland's common law had in 
fact established there was already an exclusionary rule for illegally 
seized evidence as a matter of Maryland's common law. 15 This rule 
was derived from Article 26's prohibition against warrantless 
searches and seizures as understood in light of Article 22's privilege 
against self-incrimination. 16 The court of appeals' decision in 
Meisinger not to "recognize" a state exclusionary remedy for illegally 
seized evidence was founded upon the faulty premise that Maryland 
did not already have one. 17 
10. 155 Md. 195, 141 A. 536 (1928) (reaffirming the rule of Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 
17, 63 A. 96 (1906), even in the wake of Weeks, on the basis of stare decisis). 
11. See Brown v. State, 397 Md. 89, 98, 916 A.2d 245, 251 (2007) ("Although the alleged 
conduct may also violate the Maryland Declaration of Rights, because there is no 
general exclusionary provision in Maryland for such violations, the conduct must 
violate the [F]ederal Constitution to be excluded."); Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 
58, 195 A. 324,326 (1937); Padilla v. State, 180 Md. App. 210,232,949 A.2d 68, 82 
(Ct. Spec. App. 2008) ("[N]o exclusionary rule exists for a violation of Article 26."); 
Miller v. State, 151 Md. App. 235,246, 824 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Ct. Spec. App. 2003); 
Anne Arundel County v. Chu, 69 Md. App. 523, 532, 518 A.2d 733, 737 (Ct. Spec. 
App. 1987) ("Maryland, for that matter, has no [ e ]xclusionary [ r ]ule of its own to this 
very day."); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to 
Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party 
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 373,410 n.l57 (2006); 
Irma S. Raker, Fourth Amendment and Independent State Grounds, 77 MISS. L.J. 401, 
407-08 (2007). 
12. See Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 394-96, 936 A.2d 862, 875-76 (2007) ("[T]his 
[c]ourt has adopted, as a matter of Maryland common law, an exclusionary rule in 
certain specific situations."). 
13. Meisinger, !55 Md. at 197-99, 141 A. at 536-37. 
14. Article 22 provides "[t]hat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against 
himself in a criminal case." Mo. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 22. 
15. See Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902); infra notes 55-64 and accompanying 
text. 
16. See Blum, 94 Md. at 382, 51 A. at 29 (1902). 
17. See infra Part I.C. 
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While Maryland courts have historically interpreted Article 26 in 
pari materia with the Fourth Amendment, the in pari materia 
doctrine is descriptive, not normative, as the court of appeals has 
emphasized that: 
[O]ur cases clearly recognize the similarity between the 
Fourth Amendment ... and our own older Declaration of 
Rights, Art. 26, which grew out of the same historical 
background. Because of this similarity the consistent 
position of this Court has been that "decisions of the 
Supreme Court on the kindred 4th Amendment are entitled 
to great respect." ... [A]lthough a clause of the United 
States Constitution and one in our own Declaration of 
Rights may be "in pari materia," and thus "decisions 
applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases 
involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is 
independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a 
violation of the other." 18 
Because the in pari materia doctrine is not normative, Maryland 
courts could interpret the protections of Article 26 more broadly than 
18. Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310,321-22,430 A.2d 49,55 (1981) (citations omitted); see 
also Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 400-01, 936 A.2d 862, 879 (2007); Dua v. 
Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002). The 
Oregon Supreme Court, well known for its independent state constitutionalism, began 
with a similar progression as Maryland, but ultimately decided to offer its citizens 
more rights under its state constitution. First, while acknowledging that the court 
could interpret Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution differently than the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment, the court declined to do so. See 
State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1208-09 (Or. 1974) (overruling prior Oregon 
precedent and holding that Section 9 did not require that the scope of a search incident 
to arrest be reasonably related to the offense that prompted the arrest, based on the 
persuasive authority of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held 
that warrantless searches incident to arrest were "reasonable," irrespective of their 
relationship to the offense of arrest). Only later did it actually do so. See State v. 
Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 (Or. 1982) (disagreeing with Florance and expanding the 
scope of Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution beyond the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment's protections, and finding "that a valid custodial arrest does not 
alone give rise to a unique right to search," but "must be justified by the 
circumstances surrounding the arrest"); see also State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 
1988) (holding that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Section 9 applied to the "open 
fields" beyond the curtilage of a residence); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 
1988); State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757 (Or. 1987) (rejecting the Fourth Amendment's 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test); State v. Galloway, I 09 P.3d 388 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that, under the state constitution, the defendants retained a 
possessory interest in their garbage when it was at the curb awaiting collection). 
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the Supreme Court interprets the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. While the privilege contained in Article 22 is generally 
construed in pari materia with its federal counterpart in the Fifth 
Amendment, 19 there are situations in which the privilege under 
Article 22 has been viewed more broadly than the privilege under the 
Fifth Amendment, and therefore the exclusionary rule for statements 
obtained in violation of Article 22 has been applied independently. 20 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has made clear, in cases like 
Gahan v. State, 21 that the state in pari materia doctrine is an 
empirical rather than a normative one, as it has explicitly stated that 
although Article 26 has been historically interpreted with reference to 
the persuasive authority of federal courts' interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment, this does not mean that Maryland courts are 
bound to do the same in the future. 22 If Maryland courts chose to 
interpret the protections of Article 26 more broadly than the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, Article 26 would be an 
independent state law ground on which Maryland courts could not 
only base jurisprudence, but from which they could also insulate their 
decisions, where they suppressed evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained in violation of Article 26, from Supreme Court review. 23 
19. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529, 550, 796 A.2d 697, 709 (2002); Winder v. State, 
362 Md. 275, 305-06, 765 A.2d 97, 113 (2001). 
20. See Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 535 n.3, 560 A.2d 1108, 1111 n.3 (1989) (noting that, 
although Article 22 is generally construed in pari materia with the Fifth Amendment, 
the court of appeals has viewed Article 22 differently and more broadly in two 
situations). These two situations are the cases Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 
820 (1944) (holding that Article 22 prohibited a defendant on the witness stand from 
being asked at his trial to try on an item of clothing in order to establish his ownership 
of it to connect him with the crime) and Chesapeake Club of Annapolis v. State, 63 
Md. 446 (1885) (holding that a witness's testimony about a particular subject did not 
preclude invocation of the privilege for other questions relating to the same matter). 
Cf Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (holding that a witness's answers to 
incriminating questions constituted a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination with regard to further disclosure on the same subject). 
21. Gahan, 290 Md. 310,430 A.2d 49. 
22. See id. at 321-22,430 A.2d at 55. 
23. Compare Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) ("[W]hen, as in this 
case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be 
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any 
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as 
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did 
because it believed that federal law required it to do so."), and Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (" ... we are satisfied that even if the state Constitution would 
have provided an adequate basis for the judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court did 
not intend to rest its decision independently on the State Constitution and that we have 
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In Meisinger, for example, the illegally obtained evidence at issue, 
alcohol, was seized pursuant to a warrant. 24 Although it was 
undisputed that the seizure of the alcohol was unlawful, the court of 
appeals refused to exclude the evidence used against Meisinger on 
the ground that it had been illegally obtained. 25 Essentially, the court 
applied an exception to the exclusionary remedy, such as one the 
Supreme Court would later embrace in United States v. Leon. 26 
Under the prevailing view that Maryland does not have an 
independent exclusionary rule for violations of Article 26, however, 
Article 26 is not presently an adequate state ground upon which to 
sustain the suppression of illegally obtained evidence. Recognition 
of an independent exclusionary rule under Article 26 would permit 
the Maryland courts, in cases such as Meisinger, to expand their 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures beyond what 
the Supreme Court requires. 27 The court of appeals has sometimes 
expressed a willingness to provide greater protections, as other state 
supreme courts have done, 28 but has not yet done so because it 
believes that such a remedy does not exist under state law. 29 
jurisdiction of this case), and Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) 
("[W]here the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is 
federal and the other nonfederal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal 
ground is ... adequate to support the judgment."), with Maryland v. Garrison, 480 
U.S. 79, 83-84 (1987) (reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
which was based in part on Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, because 
of prior Maryland opinions indicating that Article 26 was construed in pari materia 
with the Fourth Amendment). 
24. Meisinger v. State, !55 Md. 195, 195-96, 141 A. 536, 536 (1928). 
25. !d. at 199, 141 A. at 538. 
26. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
27. See, e.g., Pringle v. State, 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016 (2002) (holding that police 
lacked probable cause to arrest Pringle for drug possession and that Pringle's 
confession was a direct result of his illegal arrest, requiring its suppression), rev'd sub 
nom. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
28. See, e.g., State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 910 (Mont. 2001) (noting that the range of 
warrantless searches permitted by Article II, Section I 0 of the Montana Constitution 
is narrower than that permitted by the Fourth Amendment (citing State v. Elison, 14 
P.3d 456 (Mont. 2000))); State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 48 (Wash. 2002) ("[T]he 
protections guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the state constitution are qualitatively 
different from those provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." (citing City of Seattle v. McCready, 868 P.2d 134 (Wash. 1994))). 
29. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 518, 864 A.2d 1006, 1026 (2004) (Greene, 
J., dissenting) ("In order to provide Maryland residents greater protection against 
random canine sniffing searches, I believe we should reach the state constitutional 
question and declare canine sniffs of dwellings conducted on less than probable cause 
presumptively unreasonable. In addition, Maryland should adopt its own exclusionary 
rule."); Pringle v. State, 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016 (2002) (holding that police 
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The incorporation of Mapp v. Ohio's30 exclusionary remedy to the 
states occurred in the midst of the Warren Court era of expansion of 
individual liberties. 31 With the passage of the Bouse Act32 for 
misdemeanor cases, followed by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Mapp in 1961 and the Warren Court's expansion of the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection,33 Maryland courts wishing to protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures came to rely exclusively 
on federal constitutional and state statutory remedies and, at least 
until 1973, had little need for a state constitutional exclusionary 
remedy. 34 During this same time period, the Supreme Court was 
restricting the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, 35 while the court of appeals was expanding the scope 
of Article 22 and the common law prohibition against admission of 
lacked probable cause to arrest Pringle for drug possession and that Pringle's 
confession was a direct result of his illegal arrest, requiring its suppression) (reversed 
by Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 486, 
337 A.2d 100, 115 (1975) ("Thus, although it might seem more nearly constitutionally 
accurate that inquiry be made as to whether the place ... where the search and seizure 
was made ... was within an area where Everhart had a reasonably 'legitimate 
expectation of privacy,' it would seem, a fortiori, that if there was an intrusion 
geographically within the curtilage it would be within such a protected area, 
notwithstanding that such ... may have been within the officers' plain view."). 
30. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
31. See Robert Deichert, Note, Honoring the Social Compact: Arguing for a State Duty of 
Protection Under the Connecticut Constitution, 33 CoNN. L. REv. 1069, 1072-73 
(2001). 
32. Bouse Act, ch. 194, 1929 Md. Laws 533 (codified at Mo. ANN. CODE art. 35, §4A 
(Supp. 1929) (repealed 1973). 
33. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognizing a Fourth 
Amendment interest whenever a search infringed on an individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy); Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
34. Several commentators have noted a pattern where states ceased to look to their own 
constitutions during the Warren Court era. See I JENNIFER FRJESEN, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 1.01 [ 1] n.11 (4th ed. 2006) ("A generation of overreliance by 
law professors, judges, and attorneys on the federal doctrines that grew out of Warren 
Court decisions left state constitutional law in a condition of near atrophy in most 
states."); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the 
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 878 (1976) ("During the activist Warren years, it 
was easy for state courts, especially in criminal cases, to fall into the drowsy habit of 
looking no further than federal constitutional law."); Slobogin, supra note 6, at 657, 
661. 
35. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "No person ... shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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involuntary confessions. 36 With the repeal of the Bouse Act in 1973 
and the contraction of the federal exclusionary remedy, Maryland 
now finds itself in need of the same state exclusionary remedy that it 
so carelessly shed in 1928. 37 
Section I of this Article explores the doctrinal evidence that the 
Meisinger court misread historical precedents in deciding that 
Maryland did not have an independent exclusionary rule for 
suppressing evidence obtained in violation of Article 26 of the 
Declaration of Rights. It explores the origins and evolution of the 
exclusionary rule under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. It traces the exclusionary rule of Weeks 
back to its precursor for simultaneous violations of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments under the "convergence theory" of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues that Weeks is best 
understood as the first application of the exclusionary remedy to 
violations of the Fourth Amendment alone. It explores the doctrinal 
evidence for the existence of a Maryland state exclusionary remedy 
for illegally seized evidence. It argues that, historically, Maryland 
had an exclusionary rule for evidence in violation of Articles 22 and 
26 together, under the convergence theory, which should have been 
the precursor for an Article 26 exclusionary rule in the same way that 
the federal exclusionary rule for Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
violations was a precursor to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule recognized in Weeks. It argues that the Meisinger court 
misunderstood critical precedents from prior Court of Appeals of 
Maryland cases and the relationship between Articles 22 and 26 at 
common law, resulting in a "loss" of Maryland's independent 
exclusionary rule. 
36. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 497 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions]; 
see discussion infra Part I.E. 
37. See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 36, at 496--97 (discussing the contraction 
of the federal exclusionary remedy); discussion infra Part I.D (explaining the history 
of the Bouse Act). For further discussion on the interplay between state and federal 
constitutional doctrine in state courts, see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill 
of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of 
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Bill of Rights]; 
Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 36; Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Advances and 
Departures in the Criminal Law of the States: A Selective Critique, 69 ALB. L. REv. 
489 (2006); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of 
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Stanley Mosk, Introduction, California 
Constitutional Symposium, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1989); Stanley Mosk, State 
Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985). 
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Section II explores the historical evidence for the existence of a 
Maryland state exclusionary remedy for illegally seized evidence. It 
points to the language of the statute conferring upon the state the 
limited right to appeal certain rulings in a criminal case, pre-Mapp 
Maryland case law in which the courts appear to be excluding 
illegally obtained evidence on the basis of a Maryland common law 
exclusionary rule, and the development of court-created mechanisms 
for the pretrial return of illegally seized property as historical 
evidence that Maryland courts were suppressing evidence obtained in 
violation of Article 26 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Mapp, and argues that such suppression would have to have been 
based upon state law independent of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Conclusion discusses recent opinions by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in which the court declined to overrule Meisinger and 
argues that the recent contraction of Fourth Amendment protection 
by the United States Supreme Court gives rise to a need and an 
opportunity for Maryland courts to use a state exclusionary rule to 
give citizens of Maryland greater protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. It concludes that, rather than "creating" a state 
exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of Article 26, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland should recognize that one existed prior 
to Meisinger and reanimate it. 
I. MISREADING OF HISTORICAL CASES: DOCTRINAL 
EVIDENCE THAT MEISINGER WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
This Section argues that the Meisinger court misread Court of 
Appeals of Maryland precedents when it determined that the decision 
in Lawrence v. State38 foreclosed the possibility of a state 
exclusionary remedy for illegally obtained evidence. Subsection A 
traces the creation, evolution, and disappearance of the convergence 
theory at the federal and Maryland levels-between the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Articles 26 
and 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, respectively. These 
evolutionary paths were parallel up until the Supreme Court's 
decision in Weeks and the court of appeals' decision in Meisinger, 
where the jurisprudence of the two courts diverged. 39 Subsection B 
discusses the court of appeals' decision in Lawrence and 
demonstrates how Lawrence was a ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence rather than the existence of an exclusionary remedy for 
38. 103 Md. 17,63 A. 96 (1906). 
39. See discussion infra Parts LA, I. C. 
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evidence obtained in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Subsection C discusses the court of appeals' decision in Meisinger 
and explains how the majority misinterpreted its own precedent in 
determining that Maryland had no exclusionary remedy for evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 26. Subsection D traces the 
enactment and repeal of the Bouse Act in the wake of, and in reaction 
to, the court's decision in Meisinger. The Bouse Act was the primary 
vehicle for suppression of illegally seized evidence in Maryland for 
about thirty years until it was superseded by the exclusionary rule for 
Fourth Amendment violations incorporated to the states by Mapp. 40 
Subsection E discusses the ongoing vitality and expansion of the 
Maryland common law exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in 
violation of Article 22 and argues that the court of appeals' Article 22 
jurisprudence directly contradicts the Meisinger court's claim that its 
decision in Lawrence was inconsistent with an independent state 
exclusionary rule. 
A. The Birth and Death of the Convergence Theory 
Today, the Supreme Court interprets the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination as a limited right to remain silent, 
prohibiting only acts that compel testimonial communication by an 
accused-that is, other words, statements, expressive conduct, or 
testimony, compelled by police subjecting a suspect to interrogation 
against her will, investigators subpoenaing an accused for a pretrial 
deposition, or a prosecutor calling a defendant as a witness at trial. 41 
In the past, courts interpreted the prohibition against self-
incrimination to prohibit compulsion of a much wider range of 
conduct, such as forcing the production of inculpatory physical 
evidence by cross examination of a suspect. 42 During the period 
40. See Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 679-81, 537 A.2d 250, 253-54 
(1988); Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 479-80, 337 A.2d 100, 112 (1975); Venner v. 
State, 30 Md. App. 599, 613, 354 A.2d 483, 491 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976), a.ffd, 279 Md. 
47, 367 A.2d 949 (1977). 
41. Compare Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) ("[A] [d]istrict 
[c]ourt cannot compel [a witness] to answer deposition questions, over a valid 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment right .... "), with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 
463, 472-73 (1976) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit Andresen's 
seized personal papers from being used against him at trial), and Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony" from an 
accused, but not "real or physical evidence"). 
42. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (holding that the seizure of 
contraband from Agnello in violation of the Fourth Amendment permitted Agnello to 
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when the privilege was interpreted to prohibit the compelled 
production of non-testimonial types of evidence, its protections 
overlapped a great deal with those of the prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 43 Evidence obtained as a result 
of an unreasonable search or seizure was often derived directly from 
an accused in the absence of a warrant or probable cause, thereby 
violating the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, as 
well. 44 This overlap between the historical protections of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments is often referred to as the "convergence 
theory. " 45 
The convergence theory originated in Great Britain in Entick v. 
Carrington, 46 in which Lord Camden held illegal a search warrant 
issued for the home of a writer who was critical of the English 
government, holding so based upon the sanctity of property, the 
invasiveness of searches and seizures, and the right of individuals not 
to give evidence against themselves. 47 In Carrington, Lord Camden 
set forth an early formulation of the convergence between the right of 
privacy enshrined in the prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination: 
"It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; 
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling 
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and 
unjust; and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed 
upon the same principle."48 
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to prevent 
the government from introducing the contraband against him at trial). 
43. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-33 (1886). 
44. See id. at 633. 
45. See Andresen, 427 U.S. at 472 n.6; State v. Earls, 805 P.2d 211, 226 (Wash. 1991); 
State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899, 917 (Wis. 2005); see also Sanford E. Pitler, 
Comment, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary 
Rule: Constitutional Right and Constitutionally Compelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 459, 524-25 (1986) (discussing the convergence theory under the Washington 
Constitution). 
46. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765). 
47. See id. at 1066, 1073. The English common law prohibition against self-incrimination 
was expressed as "Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum (No one should be required to 
betray himself)." Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529, 549, 796 A.2d 697, 708-09 (2002). 
See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (2nd ed. 1986), 
for a comprehensive account of the British origins of the American Fifth Amendment 
and the history of the writing of the first American bills of rights, including the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
48. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. at 1073. 
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The United States Supreme Court imported and adopted the 
convergence theory when it set forth the exclusionary remedy for 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
in 1886 in Boyd v. United States, 49 which relied heavily upon 
Carrington. 50 Boyd was under investigation for violating a customs 
revenue statute by importing glass plates without paying the 
appropriate tariff. 51 The statute in question permitted the government 
to compel a suspect to produce documentary evidence-such as 
books, invoices, and papers-relating to the assessment and 
collection of customs duties, and, if the suspect refused to produce 
such evidence, permitted a court to infer guilt from the refusal. 52 The 
district attorney obtained a court order compelling Boyd to produce 
the invoice for the glass cases, and Boyd had to comply, thereby 
revealing guilt, and resulting in his conviction of customs duty 
evasion. 53 
On appeal, Boyd argued that the provisions of the customs revenue 
statute compelling production of evidence and inferring guilt from 
the failure to produce the requested evidence violated both the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments. 54 The Supreme Court agreed, reversing 
Boyd's conviction. 55 The Court relied upon the convergence theory, 
saymg: 
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the 
[Fourth and Fifth Amendments]. They throw great light on 
each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' 
condemned in the [F]ourth [A]mendment are almost always 
made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence 
against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the 
[F]ifth [A]mendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal 
case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in 
the [F]ifth [A]mendment, throws light on the question as to 
what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the 
meaning ofthe [F]ourth [A]mendment. 56 
49. 116 u.s. 616. 
50. See id. at 626-30. 
51. Seeid.at617-I8. 
52. /d. at 619-20. 
53. /d. at 618. 
54. !d. at 621-22. 
55. !d. at 638. 
56. !d. at 633. 
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During the convergence theory period, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland interpreted its state constitutional provisions governing 
search and seizure and the privilege against self-incrimination largely 
in lockstep with the Supreme Court's interpretations of the 
corresponding federal constitutional amendments. 57 Specifically, the 
court of appeals recognized a convergence between Article 26 and 
Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights almost identical to the 
convergence between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 58 In the 1902 case Blum v. State, the Blum 
Brothers, who owned a grocery business, became the targets of a 
fraud and money laundering investigation. 59 The court appointed 
receivers to administer the business during the investigation, and one 
receiver turned over the business's books, ledgers, and files to the 
fraud investigators. 60 The State used the materials provided by the 
receiver to convict the Blums. 61 On appeal, the Blums argued that, in 
seizing the inculpatory documents, the receiver and investigators had 
violated both the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article 26, and the prohibition against self-incrimination of the Fifth 
Amendment and Article 22. 62 Citing Boyd liberally, the court of 
appeals agreed, explaining that, while ordinarily the privilege against 
self-incrimination extends only to the refusal to answer an 
incriminating question or give testimony against oneself, the rights 
protected by Article 22 and the Fifth Amendment, and the rights 
protected by Article 26 and the Fourth Amendment, are "intimately 
related to each other and ... throw great light on each other."63 The 
significance of the court of appeals' adoption of the convergence 
theory is that, like federal courts interpreting the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, Maryland courts employed an exclusionary remedy for 
simultaneous violations of Articles 22 and 26, at least until the 
abandonment of the convergence doctrine.64 
Conventional wisdom holds that the Supreme Court established the 
exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in 1914 in 
57. See Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902). 
58. See id. at 382-85, 51 A. at 29-30. 
59. !d. at 377,51 A. at 27. 
60. !d. at 379, 51 A. at 28. 
61. See id. at 3 79-80, 51 A. at 28. 
62. See id. at 380, 382-83, 51 A. at 28-29. 
63. See id. at 382, 51 A. at 29. 
64. See id. at 382-85, 51 A. at 29-30. 
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Weeks. 65 In that case, police officers entered Weeks's home, on two 
separate occasions without a search warrant, searched his room, and 
seized various articles therefrom, including papers, letters, and 
envelopes. 66 On the basis of the seized evidence, Weeks was charged 
with running an illegal mail lottery. 67 Prior to trial, Weeks filed a 
petition seeking the return of his private property on the ground, inter 
alia, that its warrantless seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. 68 The trial court agreed that the search and seizure 
were illegal, but, while ordering the government to return to Weeks 
all property that was not competent as evidence at Weeks's trial, 
denied the petition with regard to all pertinent seized matters, 
ostensibly reasoning "that the [evidence] having come into the 
control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which 
they were obtained, but, if competent, would keep them and permit 
their use in evidence."69 On appeal of his conviction, relying heavily 
on Boyd, the Supreme Court held that the search of Weeks's home 
and seizure of his letters and private documents violated the Fourth 
Amendment, without addressing Weeks's Fifth Amendment claim. 70 
The Court concluded that the district court had committed prejudicial 
error by permitting Weeks's seized letters to be used against him at 
trial, rather than ordering their pretrial return. 71 The significance of 
Weeks, therefore, is not that it established an exclusionary remedy for 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather, 
that it retained Boyd's exclusionary remedy for evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment independent of the convergence 
theory and without requiring a simultaneous violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. 72 
B. Competency of Evidence 
During the same time period in which the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland were developing their convergence 
65. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (describing the Weeks decision as the 
establishment of the exclusionary rule). 
66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,386 (1914). 
67. See id. at 386, 388-89. 
68. !d. at 387. 
69. !d. at 394. 
70. See id. at 389-94, 398. 
71. /d. at 398. 
72. See id. at 389 ("The defendant contends that such appropriation of his private 
correspondence was in violation of rights secured to him by the [Fourth] and [Fifth] 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We shall deal with the [Fourth} 
Amendment .... ") (emphasis added). 
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theory jurisprudence, Maryland was also developing its common law 
of evidence. 73 Maryland subscribed to the traditional view that the 
manner in which an item was obtained did not undermine its 
competency as evidence. 74 Unfortunately, these two previously 
unrelated strands of jurisprudence, one dealing with constitutionally 
required remedies for the illegal procurement of evidence, and the 
other dealing with the competency and admissibility of illegally 
procured items as evidence, would become indefinitely intertwined in 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland's Meisinger decision. 75 This 
intertwining occurred primarily because of the Meisinger court's 
misapplication of the precedent set by Lawrence v. State. 76 
Lawrence was a leading evidence case that dealt with a challenge 
to the admissibility of evidence obtained through an illegal search 
and seizure. 77 It was decided in 1906, just four years after the court's 
decision in Blum. 78 The State charged Lawrence with theft by false 
pretenses for selling a large quantity of relatively valueless stock for 
a large amount of money. 79 The State theorized that the stock sales 
were fraudulent because Lawrence knew the stock was worth far less 
than the price for which it was sold. 80 One of the State's key pieces 
of evidence to prove its theory was that Lawrence carried large 
numbers of the certificates around town in a satchel, rather than 
storing them in a secure location, like a bank or safe, as one would 
expect him to if he believed they were very valuable. 81 At trial, 
Lawrence objected to the State's evidence that he carried the stock 
certificates on his person, claiming the certificates were not 
competent evidence because the state illegally seized them from his 
73. See, e.g., Ziehm v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 48,64 A. 61 (1906). 
74. See Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 197, 141 A. 536, 536-37 (1928); see, e.g., I 
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254(a) (15th ed. 1892) 
("[T]hough papers and other subjects of evidence may have been . . . unlawfully 
obtained, this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the 
issue. The court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to determine that question."); 8 JoHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW§ 2183 (3d ed. 1940) ("[T]he admissibility of evidence is not affected 
by the illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled to obtain the 
evidence." (emphasis removed)). 
75. 155 Md. 195, 141 A. 536; see infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra Part I.C. 
77. Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17,31-33,63 A. 96, 102 (1906). 
78. Lawrence, 103 Md. 17,63 A. 96; Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375,51 A. 26 (1902). 
79. See Lawrence, 103 Md. at 18, 26-27, 63 A. at 97, 100. 
80. See id. at 26, 63 A. at 100. 
81. See id. at 31-32, 63 A. at I 01-02. 
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person. 82 The trial court admitted the stock certificates over his 
objection as evidence that he knew their true value. 83 On appeal, the 
court of appeals affirmed Lawrence's conviction, concluding: 
[I]t would seem upon reason and the great preponderance of 
authority that the manner in which the [s]tate secured 
control of these articles did not make them inadmissible in 
evidence upon the ground [that they were taken in violation 
of Lawrence's constitutional right to security against 
unlawful search and seizure of his property]. 84 
Lawrence is the primary authority Maryland courts cite to support 
the assertion that Maryland had no exclusionary rule of its own at 
common law, because Lawrence's challenge to the admissibility of 
the stock certificates and the manner of their seizure was based, at 
least in part, on their warrantless seizure. 85 Courts since Meisinger 
have misunderstood two things about the Lawrence case: first, that 
the evidence in Lawrence was legally seized without a warrant as a 
search incident to arrest, and, second, that the nature of Lawrence's 
challenge was evidentiary, meaning that he challenged the 
admissibility of the purportedly illegally obtained evidence not as a 
remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights, but rather on 
grounds that the evidence lacked competency because of the 
allegedly unconstitutional manner in which it was obtained. 86 While 
the Lawrence opinion is rather skeletal, the court of appeals 
interpreted Lawrence's evidentiary challenge as predicated on the 
manner in which the seized evidence was obtained, characterizing it 
as follows: "The incriminatory effect of the appellant having the 
articles in question in possession arose from the relevancy of this as 
evidence to prove the issue. The objection could only go to the 
manner of its production."87 Lawrence's theory of inadmissibility, 
therefore, was more akin to a chain-of-custody or authenticity 
challenge than to a request that the court use its supervisory power to 
establish an ex ante incentive to discourage illegal law enforcement 
practices. In this sense, Lawrence's challenge to the evidence was 
82. See id. at 31-33, 63 A. at 102. 
83. See id. at 31,63 A. at 101-02. 
84. /d. at 32-33, 63 A. at 102. 
85. See, e.g., Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 676-77, 537 A.2d 250,251-52 
(1988); Padilla v. State, 180 Md. App. 210, 234-35, 949 A.2d 68, 83-84 (Ct. Spec. 
App. 2007). 
86. See Lawrence, 103 Md. at 30-33, 63 A. at 101-02. 
87. /d. at 33, 63 A. at 102 (emphasis added). 
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more like a motion in limine, or even a contemporaneous objection at 
trial, asking a court to rule that certain evidence is inadmissible on 
evidentiary grounds, 88 than a motion to suppress evidence on 
constitutional grounds, 89 if framed in modem procedural 
terminology. 90 The court of appeals rejected Lawrence's reliance on 
Boyd and Blum, finding those cases to be "dealing with a very 
different question from the one involved in the case at bar," and 
concluded "[e]vidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, 
although it may have been procured in an irregular, or even an illegal, 
manner."91 
C. The Loss of the State Exclusionary Rule for Article 26 Violations 
Maryland lost its state exclusionary rule in Meisinger-
specifically, in the Meisinger court's interpretation of the precedent 
of Lawrence. 92 Meisinger was convicted of illegal possession of 
alcohol, with intent to sell, in Cecil County, Maryland. 93 On appeal, 
Meisinger challenged the admission of alcohol seized from him 
pursuant to a search warrant that the State conceded was illegal 
because it was issued in a county where there was no statute for a 
search warrant of this character. 94 Conventional wisdom dictates that 
the narrowly divided court of appeals, in Meisinger, declined the 
Supreme Court's invitation in Weeks to "create" an independent 
exclusionary remedy for evidence obtained in violation of the state 
constitution. 95 In declining to reverse the denial of the motion to 
88. See Mo. R. 4-252(d); cf OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(B); see, e.g., Myer v. State, 403 Md. 
463, 467-68, 943 A.2d 615, 617 (2008). 
89. See Mo. R. 4-252(a)(3); cf OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(B)(3). 
90. Procedurally, the distinction between a motion in limine to exclude evidence and a 
motion to suppress is that a motion in limine seeks a tentative, preliminary ruling 
where the movant must still object to the admission of evidence at trial, while a 
motion to suppress seeks a definitive ruling prior to trial, which does not require a 
contemporaneous objection. See, e.g., Riojas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1975). Substantively, a motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for 
raising a constitutional challenge to evidence based upon an exclusionary rule, while a 
motion in limine is the proper vehicle for a preliminary ruling on evidence, as a 
movant, in order to avoid injecting prejudicial matters before the jury, asks a court for 
its anticipated ruling prior to trial on whether a party may offer a prospective item into 
evidence. See State v. French, 650 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1995); BLACK's LAW 
DICTIONARY 1038-39 (8th ed. 2004). 
91. Lawrence, 103 Md. at 34-36, 63 A. at 103. 
92. Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 197, 141 A. 536, 537 (1928). 
93. !d. at 195-96, 141 A. at 536. 
94. See id. at 196, 199, 141 A. at 536,538. 
95. See id. at 197-98, 141 A. at 537. 
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exclude the evidence, the court of appeals opined that its conclusion 
was compelled by Lawrence, which was "conclusive on the question, 
so far as this state is concemed."96 The court concluded: 
If this case were the first in this court involving the question 
now under consideration, we would be at liberty to examine 
and comment upon ~he authorities and the reasons 
supporting them in other jurisdictions, but, it having been 
definitely decided by our predecessors that when evidence 
offered in a criminal trial is otherwise admissible, it will not 
be rejected because of the manner of its obtention [sic], we 
feel bound by that decision, and are entirely content to 
follow the reasoning therein employed, especially in that it 
is supported and fortified by the weight of authority 
elsewhere. 97 
In doing so, the court relied upon a doctrinal distinction between 
evidence illegally seized from the person of the accused and evidence 
illegally seized from another location. 98 
In dissent, Judge Parke argued: 
It is therefore strictly within the province of [the Court of 
Appeals] to examine its decision in Lawrence v. State to see 
whether it was decided that, if the citizen's domicile be 
unlawfully invaded for the purpose of learning if a 
misdemeanor has been committed upon his premises, the 
evidence so procured may be used against him in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. 99 
Judge Parke distinguished the facts of Meisinger from those of 
Lawrence on the ground that the search and seizure at issue in 
Lawrence was legal. 100 He pointed out that Lawrence was under 
arrest and in police custody when his person was searched and 
evidence was seized therefrom, and that, therefore, no warrant was 
96. /d. at 197, 141 A. at 537. 
97. /d. at 199, 141 A. at 537-38; see generally Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield 
Shipyard, Inc., 186 Md. 406, 417, 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946) (explaining that, under the 
doctrine of stare decisis, a court's previous decisions should not be lightly set aside). 
98. See Meisinger, 155 Md. at 197-98, 141 A. at 537 (citing 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2264 (1st ed. 
1904)). 
99. !d. at 20 I, 142 A. 190, 191 (Parke, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
100. See id. at 201-02, 142 A. at 191. 
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required to search him incident to that arrest. 101 Judge Parke 
explained: 
It follows that Lawrence v. State ... is, on its facts, not an 
authority supporting the prevailing opinion in the instant 
case, because here the traverser was not charged with a 
crime, nor was he under arrest when his premises were 
searched. The owner was not committing a crime nor 
exposing contraband goods in the presence of an officer of 
the law, but, because the state's attorney thought he had 
probable cause to believe that the local liquor law was being 
violated, he procured an illegal search warrant whereby the 
sheriff unlawfully entered upon the traverser's premises for 
the sole purpose of discovering if a crime were being 
committed and of securing the evidence to convict the 
traverser, if his search and seizure proved successful. It, 
therefore, needs no argument to enforce the point that, 
because of wide and fundamental difference in facts, the 
decision in Lawrence v. State ... is not controlling, unless 
because it contains the declaration of some applicable 
principle of law. 102 
Judge Parke also argued that the majority's holding that "the 
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means 
through which the party has been able to obtain the evidence," could 
not be reconciled with the court's Article 22 jurisprudence: 
Should this principle be sound with reference to documents, 
chattels, and testimony obtained by illegal search and 
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States and article 26 of the Bill of 
Rights, why should it not be sound with respect to self-
criminatory evidence in the form of confessions obtained by 
unlawful or improper means from parties accused of crime 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States, and article 22 of the Bill of Rights of 
Maryland? 
. . . If the rule that the admissibility of evidence is not 
affected by the illegality of the means through which the 
101. See id. 
102. /d. at 202, 142 A. at 191. 
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party has been enabled to obtain the evidence was intended 
by Lawrence v. State . . . to be unqualifiedly pronounced, 
then, if a gaoler, by threats, by putting in fear or by torture, 
induce a prisoner in custody to confess a crime, the 
incriminatory statement would be admissible in evidence. 103 
The split between the four-judge majority and three-judge dissent 
in Meisinger was fundamentally the result of a misunderstanding of 
historical precedent. The majority failed to grasp two issues when 
refusing to order suppression of the illegally obtained evidence: (1) 
Maryland already had an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in 
violation of Article 26, under the convergence theory dating back at 
least to Blum, 104 and (2) as dissenting Judge Parke pointed out, the 
holding of Lawrence was based on evidentiary, not constitutional, 
principles. 105 
The Supreme Court and other state courts have recognized this 
distinction between evidentiary and constitutional challenges to 
seized evidence, which the Meisinger court missed. 106 Between Boyd 
and Weeks, the Supreme Court, in Adams v. New York, 107 reached the 
same result that the Court of Appeals of Maryland reached in 
Lawrence two years later. 108 The State ofNew York charged Adams 
with operating an illegal lottery. 109 Police officers obtained a 
warrant, searched Adams's office, and seized not only betting slips 
but also private, non-gambling related papers, for the purpose of 
conducting a handwriting comparison with the betting slips. 110 At 
trial, the State introduced the seized private papers in evidence over 
Adams's objection, 111 and on appeal, the Supreme Court held the 
evidence to be admissible. 112 Like the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in Lawrence, the Supreme Court relied upon Greenleaf s evidentiary 
rule that the manner in which documents are seized does not affect 
103. !d. at 203-04, 142 A. at 192. 
104. See Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382-85, 57 A. 26, 29-30 (1902). 
105. Meisinger, 155 Md. at 203-05, 142 A. at 193 (Parke, J., dissenting) ("It is not 
perceived how any constitutional right of the accused was invaded in the case of 
Lawrence v. State nor how it can be a precedent to stay the court in the instant case."). 
106. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 
(1904); see, e.g., State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261 (W.Va. 1922). 
107. 192 U.S. 585. 
I 08. For a discussion of Lawrence's holding, see supra Part I. B. 
109. Adams, 192 U.S. at 586, 588. 
II 0. !d. at 588. 
Ill. !d. at 587, 594. 
112. See id. at 597-98. 
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their admissibility. 113 In doing so, the Supreme Court distinguished 
Adams from Boyd, as the papers in Adams were not illegally seized 
and Adams was not compelled to give evidence against himself, and 
the Court expressly declined to overrule Boyd. 114 
Nonetheless, ten years later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Weeks. 115 In Weeks, the Government relied upon Adams, arguing 
that Weeks's seized papers should not be returned to him because 
they were competent as evidence, and, therefore, the Court should not 
question how they were obtained. 116 The Court characterized 
Adams's holding as "a court will not, in trying a criminal cause, 
permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent 
testimony." 117 The Court distinguished Adams and Weeks on the 
ground that Adams (like Lawrence) involved the incidental seizure of 
papers during the execution of a legal search warrant, while Weeks 
(like Meisinger) involved an application "in due season" for the 
return of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 118 
The Court concluded that Adams "afford[ ed] no authority for the 
action of the court in this case." 119 It is this distinction, between the 
evidentiary rulings in Adams and Lawrence and the constitutional 
rulings in Boyd, Blum, and Weeks, that the Meisinger court failed to 
appreciate, while other state courts recognized it. 120 In essence, the 
Meisinger majority treated as an issue of first impression an already 
long decided issue-the existence of a state exclusionary remedy for 
illegally obtained evidence. 121 As a result, the majority opinion, 
113. See id. at 594-95; Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 33-34, 63 A. 96, 103 (1906); 
GREENLEAF, supra note 74, § 254(a). 
114. Adams, 192 U.S. at 596-97. 
115. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
116. !d. at 394-96. 
117. See id. at 395-96. 
118. See id. at 396; supra notes 86, 94, 102-03 and accompanying text. 
119. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 396. 
120. See, e.g., State v. Wills, 114 S.E. 261, 268 (W.Va. 1922) ("We subscribe to the 
general doctrine that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of 
the means by which it is secured; but, where the evidence is secured by an illegal 
search or seizure in violation of the Constitution, the article so seized, as well as the 
information so illegally obtained, is inadmissible upon a trial of the accused."). But 
see Sugarman v. State, 175 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937) (refusing Sugarman's motion 
to suppress and return to him seized evidence as the fruit of an illegal search, but 
nonetheless finding the seized evidence inadmissible). 
121. See Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382-85, 51 A. 26, 29-30 (1902). 
252 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
which purported to be an exercise in stare decisis, in reality 
constituted a complete failure to understand and follow precedent. 122 
D. The Legislative Fix 
In response to the Meisinger opinion, and in recognition of public 
objection to Prohibition Era law enforcement methods, 123 the 
Maryland General Assembly enacted the Bouse Act in 1929, which 
provided that in a misdemeanor trial, evidence was inadmissible if 
either procured by an illegal search or seizure or if it had the effect of 
compelling a defendant to give evidence against himself. 124 The 
122. See supra Part I.C. Thomas Davies has documented a similar phenomenon of loss 
with respect to the common law arrest standards in the late nineteenth century: 
The bottom line is that search-and-seizure history did not follow 
the steady path that the Framers expected. In contrast to the 
conventional account of doctrinal continuity, the authentic history 
of search-and-seizure doctrine is a story of lost meanings and 
substantial discontinuity. Indeed, the authentic history is a story 
of considerable irony: it appears that the Framers were content to 
simply invoke common-law arrest standards under the rubrics of 
"the law of the land" and "due process of law" because those 
standards seemed so settled that there was no reason to set them 
out explicitly. However, when later generations became 
increasingly ignorant of the common-law standards, the 
invocative character of the Framers' texts ultimately left once-
settled arrest standards vulnerable to change and loss. 
Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of "Due 
Process of Law," 77 MISS. L.J. I, 13 (2007). 
123. See CARL N. EVERSTINE, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MD., RESEARCH REPORT NO. 27, 
THE BOUSE ACT 24-25 ( 1948). 
124. Bouse Act, ch. 194, 1929 Md. Laws 533 (codified at Mo. ANN. CODE art. 35, §4A) 
(Supp. 1929) (repealed 1973). The Bouse Act, codified as part of the Maryland 
Evidence Code, read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed 
admissible where the same shall have been procured by, through, 
or in consequence of any illegal search or seizure or of any search 
and seizure prohibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State; 
nor shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if procured by, 
through or in consequence of a search and seizure, the effect of 
the admission of which would be to compel one to give evidence 
against himself in a criminal case. 
!d. (emphasis added). 
When introduced as Senate Bill No. 237, the Bouse Act applied to all criminal 
cases, but the Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings amended and restricted the 
Act to apply only to misdemeanors. JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF 
Mo., S. 315, at 279,556-57,657 (1929); EVERSTINE, supra note 123, at 28. 
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Bouse Act forbade the admission of evidence arising from three 
categories of searches and seizures: (1) those that were illegal, (2) 
those that violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) those 
that would result in a violation of the prohibition against compelled 
self-incrimination. 125 According to the Legislative Council of 
Maryland's 1948 analysis of the Bouse Act, the Act's exclusionary 
provisions referred to both Article 26 and Article 22 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, and the "Act was passed in order to implement 
these constitutional provisions." 126 The Bouse Act was repealed in 
1973 when the Evidence section of the Maryland Code was 
recodified, 127 and the General Assembly never enacted a 
replacement. 128 
E. The Exclusionary Rule for Article 22 Violations 
The continued, and largely unquestioned, vitality of the 
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of Article 22 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 129 is perhaps the best historical 
evidence that the Meisinger court misunderstood the meaning and 
scope of Lawrence. In Maryland, in order to be admissible in 
evidence against an accused, a confession must be "voluntary under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights." 130 Maryland courts also recognize a common law 
prohibition against the admissibility of involuntary confessions, 
In Maryland, unlike some other jurisdictions, not all crimes punishable by 
imprisonment or death are felonies. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 378, 91 A. 417, 
419-20 (1914 ). Only two classes of crimes in Maryland constitute felonies, irrelevant 
of the amount of imprisonment authorized upon conviction: those that were felonies at 
common law, and those that are explicitly designated as felonies by statute. See id.; 
EVERSTINE,supra note 123, at 7-8. 
125. Bouse Act§ I. 
126. EVERSTINE, supra note 123, at 1-2. 
127. Act of Aug. 22, 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws 4, 332. 
128. See Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 393-94, 936 A.2d 862, 875 (2007) ("In 1973, as an 
initial part of the project to revise the Maryland Code, the Revisor of the statutory 
provisions submitted to the General Assembly a proposed 'Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article.' The proposed statute repealed the Bouse Act because, in the 
[erroneous] view of the Revisor at that time, the Bouse Act was 'unconstitutional' 
under Mapp v. Ohio."). 
129. See Ball v. State, 34 7 Md. 156, 173-74, 699 A.2d 1170, 1178 (1997) (quoting Hof v. 
State, 337 Md. 581,597-98,655 A.2d 370,378 (1995)). 
130. !d. (emphasis added). 
254 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
which originated in Nicholson v. State. 131 Despite the Bouse Act's 
repeal, Maryland courts apply an exclusionary remedy for violations 
of Article 22 or violations of the common law prohibition against 
involuntary confessions, as this remedy does not derive from the 
Bouse Act. 132 
An interesting aspect of Lawrence is that, had the evidence in 
Lawrence been illegally obtained, under the convergence theory it 
would have been obtained in violation not only of Article 26's 
prohibition against unreasonable and warrantless searches and 
seizures, but also in violation of Article 22's prohibition against 
compelled self-incrimination as it was understood at that time. 133 
Nonetheless, Lawrence is only viewed as authority for the 
proposition that Maryland has no exclusionary remedy for evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 26, while it has never been cited as 
authority for the proposition that Maryland has no exclusionary 
remedy for evidence obtained in violation of Article 22. 134 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has continued to exclude not only illegally 
coerced confessions, but also the fruits thereof, under the authority of 
Article 22. 135 In simplest terms, this development begs the question: 
131. 38 Md. 140, 153 (1873) (recognizing that confessions induced by threats or promises 
by officials should be excluded from evidence); see Pappaconstantinou v. State, 352 
Md. 167, 174-77, 721 A.2d 241, 244-46 (1998) ("Maryland has followed the old 
common law rule, which has seemed to adopt a per se exclusion rule that official 
promises of leniency to a defendant in custody that induce a confession render the 
confession inadmissible." (quoting Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 507, 610 A.2d 
782, 788 (1992))); Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 483-84, 536 A.2d 622, 627 (1988); 
Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 158, 423 A.2d 552, 554 (1980); Hillard v. State, 286 
Md. 145, 151-53, 406 A.2d 415,419-20 (1979); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 34-35, 
375 A.2d 1105, 1107-08 (1977); Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603-04, 56 A.2d 818, 
821-22 (1948); McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 406-09, 89 A. 1100, 1105-06 
(1914); Green v. State, 96 Md. 384, 386, 54 A. 104, 104 (1903); Biscoe v. State, 67 
Md. 6, 7-10, 8 A. 571, 571-72 (1887). 
132. See, e.g., Ball, 347 Md. at 173-74, 699 A.2d at 1178; Pappaconstantinou v. State, 118 
Md. App. 668,675-76,703 A.2d 1295, 1298-99 (Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
133. See EVERST!NE, supra note 123, at 10 ("[T]he Court of Appeals accepted it as a 
compulsion upon Lawrence to give evidence against himself in a criminal 
prosecution."). 
134. See cases cited supra notes 10-11, 131. 
135. See Kidd v. State, 33 Md. App. 445, 469, 366 A.2d 761, 775 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977) 
(recognizing that "the massive and immemorial body of Maryland common law" was 
largely "grounded directly in Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights proscribing 
compelled self-incrimination" and the "parallel federal provisions"). An interesting 
question, beyond the scope of this Article, is why the exclusionary remedy for coerced 
confessions sometimes became categorized as a common law rule, rather than a 
constitutional rule, after Nicholson. This categorization is particularly interesting in 
light of the Nicholson court's recognition that the "rule of practice" excluding coerced 
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if Lawrence truly stands for the proposition that the manner in which 
evidence is obtained does not affect its competency, then how can the 
courts suppress illegally obtained confessions on the basis of the 
manner in which they were obtained (i.e., involuntarily)? The 
answer, as the Supreme Court has explained in the context of the 
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, is that there is a fundamental 
difference between the inadmissibility of evidence at trial and the 
suppression of evidence that has been illegally obtained: "The 
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a 
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used 
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." 136 It is this 
distinction between inadmissible evidence and suppressed evidence 
that the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognizes in its Article 22 
jurisprudence, even while the court continues to follow Meisinger 
and ignore this distinction in its Article 26 jurisprudence. 
Allen v. State 137 provides a textbook example of the disconnection, 
in the wake of Meisinger's misconstruction of Lawrence, between the 
evisceration of the Article 26 exclusionary rule and the continued 
expansion of the Article 22 exclusionary rule. Allen was charged 
with assault with intent to rape. 138 A hat was found at the crime 
scene, and the State produced evidence that Allen owned the hat. 139 
Allen denied ownership of the hat, but, over his objection, he was 
required to try it on at trial, on the theory that if the hat fit, the jury 
could not acquit. 140 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
reversed Allen's conviction, holding that it was compelled self-
incrimination in violation of Article 22 to require him to try on the 
hat: 
In passing upon these border-line cases, of which the one at 
bar is a striking illustration, the test is who furnished or 
produced the evidence? If the accused, especially if in open 
court and on the witness stand, is made to do so by 
confessions in criminal cases did not apply in civil cases (generally a characteristic of 
constitutional rules of evidence), see Nicholson, 38 Md. 140, 157 (1873), and the 
Supreme Court's recognition that the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule stemmed 
from the test that "has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts 
for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness," Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 
568, 602 (1961). 
136. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
137. 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944). 
138. !d. at 605, 39 A.2d at 821. 
139. !d. 
140. !d. at 605-06, 39 A.2d at 821. 
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performing an act or experimentation which might aid in 
connecting him with the crime and establishing his guilt, it 
is inadmissible. 141 
Essentially, the court of appeals recognized a violation of Allen's 
privilege against self-incrimination through the unconstitutional 
manner in which the evidence relating to the hat was obtained, and 
therefore recognized that the evidence must be suppressed, even 
though there was no doubt about its competency. 142 In sum, 
Maryland courts' continued recognition of an exclusionary remedy 
for Article 22 violations is proof that the holding in Lawrence could 
not have stood for the proposition that the Meisinger court ascribed to 
it. 
II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF A STATE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE FOR ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE PRIOR TO 
MAPP: MEISINGER WAS NOT ALWAYS FOLLOWED 
Mapp v. Ohio 143 applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states 
rather late in the timeline of search and seizure jurisprudence. 144 The 
Supreme Court separately incorporated to the states, in a two-step 
process, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures and the exclusionary remedy for violations of 
this prohibition. 145 In Wolf v. Colorado, 146 the Court applied to the 
states the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, but expressly declined to incorporate the 
exclusionary rule of Weeks. 147 It was not until Mapp, in 1961, that 
the Court held that due process required the states to exclude 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 148 The 
significance of this chronology is that, if Maryland courts were 
applying an exclusionary remedy for evidence obtained from illegal 
searches and seizures prior to the Court's decision in Mapp in 1961, 
141. !d. at 611, 39 A.2d at 823. 
142. /d. at 612-13, 39 A.2d at 824. 
143. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
144. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of a 
federal exclusionary remedy in the 1914 Weeks decision). 
145. See Mapp, 367 U.S. 643; Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
146. 338 U.S. 25. 
147. !d. at 27-28, 33. 
148. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-86 (1963), 
the Court extended the scope of the exclusionary rule to require suppression not only 
of evidence directly seized, but also evidence indirectly obtained as the fruit of police 
conduct infringing upon Fourth Amendment rights. 
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then any such remedy could not have derived from the federal 
constitution, but rather could have derived only from state law. 
This Section discusses pre-Mapp vestiges, existing in statutes, case 
law, and court rules, of Maryland's common law exclusionary rule 
for evidence obtained in violation of Article 26. These vestiges 
represent codifications of the distinction, that the Meisinger court 
failed to appreciate, between evidence that is inadmissible, and 
evidence that is suppressed because of a constitutional violation. 149 
This Section argues that these vestiges are historical evidence that 
there was a common law exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in 
violation of Article 26. Subsection A analyzes the Maryland statute 
governing the State's right of appeal in criminal cases and argues, 
based upon statutory construction principles, that the wording reflects 
a distinction between evidence that a trial court rules inadmissible 
and evidence that is suppressed as a remedy for a violation of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Subsection B analyzes two pre-
Mapp decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in which the 
court seemed both to apply an exclusionary remedy for evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 26 and to understand said remedy as 
such. Subsection C discusses the process of codification of pretrial 
exclusionary rules into the modem court rules governing the return of 
a criminal defendant's illegally seized property after trial. This 
Subsection argues that these modem rules are vestiges of older rules 
permitting the return of a criminal defendant's property prior to trial, 
which effectively rendered the property unavailable for the State's 
prosecution without a determination that the evidence was necessarily 
inadmissible. 
A. The State's Right of Appeal 
The statutory language conferring upon the State the limited right 
to appeal a criminal case embodies the historical distinction between 
evidence excluded as inadmissible and evidence suppressed as a 
remedy for a constitutional violation. 150 The State's right of appeal in 
a criminal case is limited and wholly statutory. 151 A Maryland 
statute, originally codified in 1957 (four years prior to Mapp), confers 
upon the State a right, in certain circumstances, to appeal from a trial 
149. See discussion infra Part II.A-C. 
150. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
151. See Jones v. State, 298 Md. 634, 637, 471 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1984); State v. Bailey, 
289 Md. 143, 147, 422 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980); see also Sanabria v. United States, 
437 U.S. 54, 77-78 (1978) (discussing federal statutory and constitutional limitations 
on the Government's right to appeal in a criminal case). 
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court's decision to grant a motion to suppress illegally seized 
evidence. 152 The statute provides, in pertinent part, that: 
In a criminal case ... involving a crime of violence ... [or a 
drug-trafficking offense], the State may appeal from a 
decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by 
the State or requires the return of property alleged to have 
been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. 153 
It is the two uses of the word "or" in the statutory provision that are 
noteworthy. The first "or" separates the State's right to appeal a trial 
court's decision that the State's evidence is inadmissible, from the 
State's right to appeal a trial court's order returning evidence 
obtained unconstitutionally. 154 The second "or" separates a violation 
of the federal constitution from a violation of the state constitution. 155 
The first "or" in section 12-302( c )(3)(i) implies a meaningful 
distinction between inadmissible evidence and suppressed evidence 
that is analogous to the difference between the inadmissibility at issue 
in Lawrence and the suppression at issue in Meisinger. 156 Namely, 
this distinction is between material the trial court has deemed 
inadmissible in evidence, and material the court has deemed 
admissible in evidence but has suppressed due to the unconstitutional 
manner in which it was obtained. 157 The second "or," by separating 
the United States Constitution from the Maryland Constitution and 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, implies that these are separate 
authorities upon which a trial court could suppress evidence. 158 The 
statute therefore permits the State to appeal the suppression of 
evidence allegedly seized in violation of the federal constitution or 
the state constitution, as if the two types of suppression were separate 
and independent of one another. 
152. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302 (c)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2006) (original 
version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 14 (1957)). Art. 5, § 14 replaced MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 5, § 86 (1951), which had afforded a general right of appeal to all parties to a 
criminal case. See State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 74 n.8, 785 A.2d 1275, 1282 n.8 
(2001 ); Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 405, 644 A.2d II, 22-23 (1994) (Eldridge, J., 
dissenting). 
153. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-302 (c)(3)(i) (emphasis added). 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
156. See id.; supra notes 86-91, 97-107 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
158. See CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-302 (c)(3)(i). 
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B. CaseLaw 
Two post-Meisinger, pre-Mapp cases from the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland provide possible evidence of the existence of a state 
exclusionary remedy for evidence obtained in violation of Article 
26. 159 One is the 1954 case Gattus v. State, 160 in which the Baltimore 
City Police Department investigated a suspected illegal gambling 
operation occurring in a vehicle parked in a vacant lot in Baltimore 
City. 161 The police obtained a search warrant authorizing them to 
search the vehicle and seize any evidence of illegal gambling, as well 
as search and arrest any individuals found inside the vehicle engaged 
in said gambling. 162 While the police watched for the suspect 
vehicle, preparing to execute the warrants, Gattus drove next to their 
car, and then immediately drove away when the police called him to 
stop. 163 The police followed him out of Baltimore City into 
Baltimore County, 164 where they acted pursuant to the Baltimore City 
warrants in stopping his vehicle, seizing illegal gambling slips, and 
arresting him. 165 It was undisputed that the Baltimore City warrants 
were invalid in Baltimore County. 166 Because the police executed the 
warrants outside their territorial jurisdiction, Gattus moved the court, 
prior to trial, to quash the search warrant and to order inadmissible 
the evidence obtained therefrom. 167 The trial court denied the 
motions, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. 168 The 
court held as follows: "Finding that the search was invalid; that the 
motion to quash the search warrant should have been granted and the 
articles seized thereunder were not admissible in evidence . . . the 
judgment will be reversed." 169 
159. See Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661 (1954); Dail v. Price, 184 Md. 140, 
40 A.2d 334 (1944). 
160. 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661. 
161. See id. at 592, 105 A.2d at 662. 
162. See id. at 593, 105 A.2d at 662. 
163. See id. at 593-94, 105 A.2d at 662-63. 
164. Baltimore City and Baltimore County are two entirely separate political subdivisions 
within the state of Maryland. See Maryland Association of Counties, About the 
Counties/Overview, http://www.mdcounties.org/counties/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2008). 
165. See Gattus, 204 Md. at 594, 105 A.2d at 663. 
166. See id. at 594, 105 A.2d at 663; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § l-
203(a)(l)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) (authorizing judges to issue search warrants only for 
crimes being committed "within the territorial jurisdiction of the judge"). 
167. See Gattus, 204 Md. at 594-95, 105 A.2d at 663-64. 
168. See id. at 601, 105 A.2d at 666. 
169. !d. 
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The second case providing possible evidence of a state 
exclusionary remedy for Article 26 violations, is the 1944 case Dail 
v. ·Price. 170 Dail's procedural posture is somewhat convoluted, as it 
was a civil suit by Dail that arose from a criminal suit in which Dail 
was a defendant. 171 Pursuant to a search warrant, the Dorchester 
County Police Department seized a large quantity of alcohol from 
Dail. 172 On the basis of the seized evidence, the grand jury indicted 
Dail on two charges: unlawful possession of alcohol without a 
license, and unlawful sale of alcohol without a license. 173 Prior to 
trial, Dail filed a motion to quash the search warrant, on the ground 
that the motion was issued without probable cause, and sought the 
return of the seized alcohol. 174 The trial court granted Dail' s motion 
to quash the search warrant, but did not rule on the motion to return 
the alcohol. 175 While the case proceeded to trial on the unlawful sale 
charge, and Dail was convicted, the State appealed the quashing of 
the search warrant in the possession-with-intent-to-distribute case. 176 
The State's appeal in this latter case was dismissed because there was 
not yet a final judgment in the case, and there was no trial court 
ruling on record that the court of appeals could consider. 177 
In the meantime, Dail filed a petition, initiating a separate civil 
action against the Dorchester County Police Department, seeking the 
return of the seized alcohol. 178 The Police Department answered the 
petition and argued that the trial court's quashing of the search 
warrant was not a final judgment but rather "merely a ruling on 
evidence." 179 Perhaps unfortunately for the sake of procedural 
clarity, the civil trial court denied Dail' s petition for the return of the 
alcohol on the ground that the search warrant was validly issued; Dail 
subsequently appealed. 180 
The court of appeals dismissed Dails's appeal, characterizing it as a 
collateral attack of a preliminary ruling in a pending criminal case. 181 
More importantly to this Article's thesis, the court characterized 
Dail' s pretrial motion to return his seized property as nonevidentiary 
170. 184 Md. 140, 40 A.2d 334 (1944). 
171. Seeid. at 141-42,40A.2dat335. 
172. See id. at 141, 40 A.2d at 335. 
173. See id. 
174. Id. 
175. See id. 
176. Id. 
177. !d.; see State v. Jones, 182 Md. 368, 369-70, 34 A.2d 775, 776 ( 1943). 
178. See Dail, 184 Md. at 141, 40 A.2d at 335. 
179. Id. at 142, 40 A.2d at 335. 
180. Id. at 142-43, 40 A.2d at 335-36. 
181. Id. at 143,40 A.2d at 336. 
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in nature, even though the motion's granting would have resulted in 
exclusion of the evidence and a likely dismissal of the charges: 
The appellant ... is, in effect, making a collateral attack 
upon that judgment, by seeking a review of a ruling that was 
preliminary to a criminal proceeding then pending. Such a 
ruling is not technically a ruling upon evidence, but it may 
be conclusive as to the admissibility in evidence of the 
articles seized .... 
. . . While the judge is directed [in exerc1Slng criminal 
jurisdiction] to cause the property to be returned if he finds 
the warrant invalid for want of probable cause, and this 
would ordinarily be the end of the case, [the motion] was 
not designed as a substitute for an action in replevin ... for 
the determination of the right to possession of property after 
it has served its purpose as real evidence in a criminal 
case. 182 
Both Gattus and Dail involved misdemeanors, so it is possible that 
the exclusionary remedy applied in both cases derived from the 
Bouse Act, although neither case cited the Bouse Act as authority. 
Similarly, many Article 22 and common law confession cases from 
the same time period did not rely upon the Bouse Act as authority for 
the suppression of statements taken in violation of the prohibition 
against compelled self-incrimination. 183 Additionally, the court of 
appeals in Dail drew a distinction between Dail's pretrial motion to 
quash the search warrant and return his seized property and a motion 
seeking a "ruling upon evidence." 184 It is precisely this distinction 
that the court failed to appreciate in Meisinger-namely, the 
distinction between a motion to suppress (like the motions in Blum 
and Gattus) and a motion in limine seeking a ruling that evidence is 
inadmissible (like the motion that was rejected in Lawrence). 
C. Pretrial Return of Seized Evidence 
While the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence existed 
as a remedy for violations of Articles 26 and 22, it was a creation of 
the common law. 185 Common law exclusionary remedies may have 
182. !d. at 143-44, 40 A.2d at 336 (citation omitted). 
183. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
184. See Dail, 184 Md. at 143, 40 A.2d at 336. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 55--64. 
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been widespread among the states prior to Mapp. The Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which largely codified the common law rules 
of procedure that preexisted them, permit a defendant to move for the 
return of illegally seized evidence. 186 As a practical matter, these 
motions are generally made after trial, since the rule precludes return 
of the evidence in a manner that would render it unavailable for 
admission at trial. 187 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 41 
strongly suggest the rule was originally a codification of the Weeks 
exclusionary remedy, and only recently became a mechanism to 
return property to a defendant without suppressing it at trial. 188 The 
Notes to the adoption of the rule in 1944 state, in pertinent part: 
This rule is a restatement of existing law and practice, ... 
Weeks v. United States, [with the exception that, w]hile 
under existing law a motion to suppress evidence or to 
compel return of property obtained by an illegal search and 
seizure may be made ... before a commissioner ... the rule 
provides that such motion be made only before the court. 189 
However, the Advisory Committee Notes for the 1989 
Amendments to Rule 41 (e), the precedent rule to current Rule 41 (g), 
state the following, in pertinent part: 
The amendment deletes language dating from 1944 stating 
that evidence shall not be admissible at a hearing or at a trial 
if the court grants the motion to return property under Rule 
41(e). This language has not kept pace with the 
development of the exclusionary rule doctrine .... 
Rule 41 (e) is not intended to deny the United States the 
use of evidence permitted by the [F]ourth [A]mendment and 
federal statutes, even if the evidence might have been 
unlawfully seized. 190 
186. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (Supp. 2008) ("Motion to Return Property. A person 
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property . . . may move for the 
property's return .... If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the 
movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and 
its use in later proceedings." (emphasis omitted)). 
187. See id.; see, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 530 F.3d 502, 503 (7th Cir. 2008). 
188. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory 
committee's note to 1989 amendment. 
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (citations omitted). 
190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note to 1989 amendment. 
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This interplay, overlap, and confusion between suppression of 
evidence, which, in a criminal trial, is often contraband, as a remedy 
for a constitutional violation under Weeks and a replevin-like 
mechanism for return of property after its use at trial, is reminiscent 
of the confusion by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Meisinger 
about the interplay and overlap between the suppression mechanism 
of Blum and Weeks and the traditional evidentiary rule adopted in 
Lawrence. 191 
III. CONCLUSION 
The federal exclusionary rule recognized in Boyd and Weeks was 
an entirely judicially created remedy, which presents an obvious 
question: Why is it necessary to prove the historical existence at 
common law of an exclusionary remedy for Article 26 violations 
when the Court of Appeals of Maryland could simply create one as 
part of its inherent power to interpret the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights? The doctrinal answer is that evidence for the existence of an 
historical exclusionary remedy at common law is not necessary, 192 
although, under the principle of stare decisis, proof of a remedy's 
prior existence might strengthen the argument for its current 
recognition. 193 The practical answer is quite simply this: the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has been repeatedly asked to create a judicial 
remedy for violations of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights that is independent from the federal remedy for violations of 
the Fourth Amendment. 194 So far, except in a few limited 
191. See supra Part I. C. 
192. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. ofEduc., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 
903 (1983) (pointing out that Maryland's "common law is not static," but is rather 
subject to modification by judicial decision). 
193. See Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 186 Md. 406, 417, 4 7 A.2d 365, 370 
( 1946) (recognizing that "it is sometimes advisable to correct a decision ... wrongly 
made in the first instance, if it is found that the decision is clearly wrong and contrary 
to other established principles"); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369, 381 (1868) 
("Previous decisions of this court should not be disturbed ... unless it is plainly seen 
that ... some egregious blunder [has been] committed." (emphasis added)); see, e.g., 
State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 79, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001) (overruling Cardinell v. 
State, 335 Md. 381, 785 A.2d 1275 (1994) because it "was wrongly decided"). 
194. Several commentators, not to mention the Supreme Court in Weeks, have invited state 
supreme courts to create independent state remedies for constitutional violations. On 
November 18, 1986, for example, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered a lecture at 
New York University School of Law about the revival of state constitutions as 
guardians of individual rights. Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 36. In his lecture, 
Justice Brennan lamented what he observed as a trend, in the years since 1969, 
towards a contraction of the scope of federal rights. He approvingly noted examples 
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circumstances, the court has declined to do so. 195 What the court of 
of state courts that interpreted their state constitutions in a more protective manner of 
individual rights than the Supreme Court's interpretations of analogous federal 
constitutional provisions, and called upon the state courts to continue to play a role in 
protecting individual rights through revival of their state constitutions. See id.; see 
also Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 36 (urging state courts to turn to their 
own constitutions to buffer the impact of the federal conservative revolution); Jerome 
B. Falk, Jr., The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Norifederal Ground, 61 
CAL. L. REv. 273 (1973); Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and 
the Need for a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REv. 125 (1969); Hans A. Linde, Without 
"Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970). 
195. See Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 394-96, 399, 936 A.2d 862, 875-76, 878 (2007); 
Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 506--12, 864 A.2d 1006, 1019-23 (2004); Chu v. 
Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 674-75,680 n.2, 686,537 A.2d 250,250-51, 
253 n.2, 256 (1988) (declining to apply an exclusionary rule to civil actions for the 
return of property taken pursuant to a search warrant, but also declining to hold that a 
state exclusionary rule would not apply in other contexts). But cf Sheetz v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 214-16, 553 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1989) (stating that, 
although under Maryland common law the exclusionary rule was generally 
inapplicable in civil administrative employee discharge hearings, the court was 
unwilling to hold that illegally seized evidence was "always admissible"); Chase v. 
State, 309 Md. 224, 251-56, 522 A.2d 1348, 1362-64 (1987) (holding that, even 
though the exclusionary rule was ordinarily inapplicable to the admission of illegally 
seized evidence in probation revocation proceedings, the Maryland common law 
doctrine of fundamental fairness dictated that "when the officer has acted in bad faith . 
. . the evidence should, in any event, be suppressed."). 
In response to the most recent request for a state exclusionary remedy, the sole 
dissenting judge in Parker v. State noted that the majority went to great lengths to 
recognize a case-specific exclusionary rule based on the procedural posture of the 
appeal at issue, rather than simply answering the petitioner's call to create a state 
remedy for illegally obtained evidence. See Parker, 402 Md. at 411-12, 936 A.2d at 
885-86 (Raker, J., dissenting) ("Unless this Court is prepared to state explicitly that 
the Court decides this case on Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and 
that the Court deviates from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ... the judgment ... 
should be affirmed based on Hudson v. Michigan . . . . I do not believe that 'the 
peculiar circumstances of a case' should be the source of an exclusionary rule .... " 
(citations omitted)). 
Baltimore City police officers obtained "no-knock" search warrants for three 
residences, and upon execution found Parker inside one of the residences. !d. at 376, 
936 A.2d at 864-65 (majority opinion). The search of various places in the residence 
revealed cocaine, marijuana, a large quantity of hidden cash, a handgun, and 
ammunition. !d. at 376--77, 936 A.2d at 865. Parker was charged with various drug 
and weapons related offenses, including possession of a regulated firearm and 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. /d. at 377, 936 
A.2d at 865. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, and the 
trial court found that while the "no-knock" portion of the warrant was unnecessary, 
Parker's motion should be denied based on the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. /d. at 377-78, 936 A.2d at 865. Parker appealed to the Court of 
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Special Appeals of Maryland, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress. !d. at 378, 936 A.2d at 866. 
When Parker made his motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland had recently decided Davis v. State, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A.2d 84 (Ct. 
Spec. App. 2002), rev'd, 383 Md. 394, 859 A.2d 1112 (2004). Davis discussed "no-
knock" entries in light of Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997), in which 
the Supreme Court held, "in order to justify a 'no-knock' entry, the police must have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence . . . would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." 
Davis, 144 Md. App. at 152-54, 797 A.2d at 89-90. The Davis court explained that, 
while the law enforcement officers in Richards "did not have no-knock authorization 
in the search warrant," the Richards holding also authorized a "no-knock" search 
warrant where the warrant application established a reasonable suspicion of exigent 
circumstances. See id. 
While Parker's appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed Davis, holding that "Maryland does not 
statutorily authorize its judicial officers to issue 'no-knock' warrants." Davis v. State, 
383 Md. 394, 387, 409, 859 A.2d 1112, 1113-14, 1121 (2004), superseded by statute, 
Act of May 26, 2005, ch. 560, 2005 Md. Laws 3212 (codified at Mo. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 1-203(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007)). On appeal, Parker argued that the 
trial court's reliance upon the good faith exception for "no-knock" warrants was 
erroneous in light of the new Davis decision, and that the "no-knock" entry violated 
both the Fourth Amendment and Article 26. Parker, 402 Md. at 387, 936 A.2d at 871. 
The State argued that the entry and search were constitutional because there were 
exigent circumstances, at the time of entry, that justified the officers' failure to knock 
and announce. See id. at 387-88, 936 A.2d at 871. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland agreed with neither party, and remanded the case for a determination on 
whether, in light of Davis, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. 
!d. at 388, 936 A.2d at 871-72. 
Parker filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the court of appeals, raising two 
issues with respect to the "no-knock" entry: (1) whether the trial court should conduct 
a new suppression hearing to determine whether exigent circumstances existed to 
justify the "no-knock" entry and, if not, whether the good faith exception applied and 
(2) whether the "no-knock" entry violated either the Fourth Amendment or Maryland 
law, requiring suppression of its fruits. !d. at 388-89, 936 A.2d at 872. Instead of 
filing a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, the State filed an answer, arguing that the 
intermediate appellate court's judgment was correct because the "no-knock" entry was 
constitutional. See id. at 389, 936 A.2d at 872. 
The day after the court of appeals granted Parker's petition, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), "holding that the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was inapplicable to 'knock and announce' 
violations." Parker, 402 Md. at 389, 936 A.2d at 872. Before the court of appeals, 
Parker relied on Davis in arguing that "'exclusion [wa]s the appropriate remedy for 
evidence obtained as the result of an entry made in violation of the knock and 
announce requirements of Article 26 and Maryland common law."' Parker, 402 Md. 
at 389-90, 936 A.2d at 872. The State responded that Hudson was dispositive to the 
suppression issue because Article 26 was construed in pari materia with the Fourth 
Amendment, and further that Article 26 did not have its own exclusionary remedy. 
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appeals has been willing to do in recent years is reach back into 
Maryland's judicial history and reanimate common law doctrines 
thought to be lost. In the case of Skok v. State, 196 for example, the 
court held that the common law writ of coram nobis was not 
preempted by Maryland's postconviction statute. 197 The court further 
held that the remedy was even broader than at common law, and was 
available to Skok to challenge the collateral immigration 
consequences of his state drug possession conviction. 198 
In sum, what this article urges the Court of Appeals of Maryland to 
do is recognize the empirical and doctrinal mistake made by its 
predecessors in Meisenger, reverse course, and bring back to life the 
state exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of Article 
26. An independent state exclusionary rule is worth developing. 
See id. at 390, 936 A.2d at 872-73. Rather than address the issue of whether to adopt 
an exclusionary rule under Article 26 or the Maryland common law of evidence, the 
court of appeals instead found as follows: (I) the State failed to preserve the 
exclusionary rule issue for appellate review because the State failed to address the 
assumption in the lower court opinions that an exclusionary rule was applicable, and 
(2) Hudson should not be applied retroactively to reverse a judgment to a criminal 
defendant's detriment. See id. at 396--98, 401-05, 936 A.2d at 876--77, 879-82. The 
court held 
[W]e shall assume arguendo that, under federal law, Hudson v. 
Michigan controls the Fourth Amendment issue in this case, and 
that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is inapplicable to 
any violations of the "knock and announce" principle that may 
have occurred in the case at bar. We shall decide, however, that, 
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence is 
excludable if there is a violation of Maryland's "knock and 
announce" principle. This is a very limited decision based 
exclusively upon Maryland non-constitutional law and procedure. 
Consequently, ifthere was a violation of Maryland's common law 
"knock and announce" principle in this case, the evidence is 
inadmissible under the particular circumstances here. Whether 
such an exclusionary rule should be applied when there are 
violations of the Maryland "knock and announce" principle in 
other cases, or in cases arising after the effective date of 
[Maryland's "no-knock" warrant statute], are matters which we 
leave for another day. 
!d. at 399, 406, 936 A.2d at 878, 882 (additional emphasis added). 
196. 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000). 
197. Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -109 
(LexisNexis 2001). See Skok, 361 Md. at 63-66, 760 A.2d at 653-54. 
198. See Skok, 361 Md. at 61-77,760 A.2d at 651-60. 
